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Introduction

The starting point of this analysis is the identification of the relevant norms of international law. On 8 July 2024, the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv was hit. It has been established that Russian cruise missiles, whose flight is automated, very probably struck the hospital.1 The present wars in the Gaza Strip and the war of aggression against Ukraine illustrate the considerable practical relevance of the legal questions involved. Such current developments therefore give occasion for a closer examination under international law.

Fundamental Criteria of Attribution in International Criminal Law

International criminal law comprises all norms that are capable of directly establishing criminal liability at the level of international law.2 International criminal law must be distinguished from international humanitarian law in general. Not every violation of international humanitarian law directly gives rise to the possibility of prosecuting the individual concerned.

State Responsibility

A distinction from State responsibility is also necessary. In that regard, the State itself is held responsible for a violation of the law if the violation can be attributed to it. Such attribution can arise where a primary obligation under international law, for instance under treaties or customary law, is breached by the State itself or by its organs. As regards the formation of customary international law, a so-called opinio iuris is required, that is, a conviction that a rule is law, concerning a norm that can be directly assigned to customary international law.3

The Rome Statute of the ICC

An important legal basis of international criminal law is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Art. 21 Rome Statute contains a hierarchy of the law to be applied by the ICC. Thus, in the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict, apply. Moreover, German law is governed by the Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, VStGB), which is modelled on the requirements of the Statute and implements them.

Treaties under International Law

The first relevant instrument is the Geneva Convention of 1864. Today, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977 apply. They are the starting point of codified international humanitarian law. The Charter of the United Nations is also an indispensable component. Under Article 59(2) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG), treaties under international law generally have the rank of ordinary federal law within the domestic legal order.

These conventions form the core of international humanitarian law. They are chiefly concerned with protection against cruelty and inhumanity in situations of war. They establish a minimum standard of humanity that is to be preserved in such precarious situations. Thus, in armed conflicts the parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives (the so-called principle of distinction, cf. Art. 48 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I)). Also decisive is the incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects that may be expected, in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated (the so-called principle of proportionality, cf. Art. 51(5)(b) AP I). A minimum standard must therefore be guaranteed under which the expected incidental harm is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.4

In this context, the principle of precaution under Art. 57 AP I must also be observed. Accordingly, in the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. They must not be made the object of military operations. The so-called hors de combat case5 also becomes relevant here. This refers to a soldier who becomes incapable of fighting and who then, comparable to the protection of a civilian, enjoys special protection. The case may now arise in which the weapon system wrongly recognises this soldier as uninjured and thus as capable of fighting.6

The Yamashita Standard Doctrine

Liability under the Yamashita standard originates from the 1946 trial of the Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita. In substance, the commander is liable if he has lost control and should have prevented crimes. His position as the responsible commander was decisive, and he could not evade the duties of control arising from it. The Supreme Court held that it was his duty to take all necessary acts and measures to protect the civilian population and prisoners.7 The legislature implemented this doctrine of liability in Section 4 VStGB. Accordingly, a military commander or other superior is responsible if he fails to prevent a subordinate from committing an offence under the Code of Crimes against International Law. This refers, for example, to a war crime under Section 8 VStGB. Section 4 VStGB thus concerns the conscious failure to prevent such an offence. The responsibility of military commanders and other superiors, as regulated in Art. 28 Rome Statute, was not adopted in full. However, the violation of the duty of supervision under Section 14 VStGB and the failure to report a crime under Section 15 VStGB were additionally regulated. This is a graduated system of responsibility.

The construct of responsibility is, however, considerably more complex. It must be examined which specific duties are to be imposed beyond this on the developers of these systems, on the State and on military commanders.8 A similar multi-person construct of criminal responsibility can be found, for example, in the well-known Leather Spray case (Lederspray-Fall).9 That case concerned the obligation of the managing directors to recall a product. The Federal Court of Justice (BGH) even constructed a form of commission as co-perpetrators in order to be able to establish causation in the committee decision.

Position of Guarantor (Garantenstellung) and Organisational Responsibility, Duties of Command and Supervision

Military Commanders

Hypothetical Case Construction

Suppose the following case were constructed: The military commander K orders the soldier S to deploy an autonomous weapon system (AWS). The specific operational planning and execution are incumbent on S. The targeted enemy objective is located in an area formerly used in part by civilians and constitutes a militarily significant target. The purpose of the attack is to eliminate remaining soldiers who, according to the current state of knowledge, are being supplied with weapons, ammunition and food by means of remote-controlled robots. During the attack, K learns that S has defined the autonomous operational area so broadly that it also contains a residential building with numerous civilians. He knows that the AWS cannot always reliably distinguish between civilian and military objects in complex operational environments.10 Further reconnaissance or a restriction of the autonomous operational area would reduce the risk of civilian harm, but could jeopardise the intended element of surprise. Although K, as commander, could prohibit or spatially restrict the operation, he does not intervene and accepts further injury to civilians (billigend in Kauf nehmen, i.e. accepts it with approval). During the attack, K additionally receives the report that numerous civilians have already been hit. Nevertheless, he does not order the attack to be aborted. S knows that, if the attack is continued, civilians will certainly be killed or injured. Nevertheless, he continues the attack. In addition to enemy soldiers, numerous civilians are hit. Among other things, a residential building in which many civilians who have fled are staying is destroyed. They had sought protection and hidden there. In the process, approximately 100 civilians and wounded soldiers are killed. Approximately 20 further civilians are critically injured, some lose limbs, and are at risk of bleeding to death.

Under Section 1 VStGB, the VStGB is also applicable where the offence was committed abroad and bears no relation to Germany. This is the so-called pure universal jurisdiction principle (echtes Weltrechtsprinzip).11 German criminal law and the VStGB thus apply without further ado. Moreover, the VStGB functions here within the framework of the principle of complementarity12 in relation to the Rome Statute of the ICC, cf. Art. 17 Rome Statute. The ICC thereby serves as a court of last resort or reserve court.13

Ultimately, the following considerations underlie the principle of universal jurisdiction and the principle of complementarity: they follow from the consequentia mirabilis. Although universal jurisdiction affects the connecting factors of State criminal jurisdiction, this is justified by the special dimension of protection of elementary interests of humanity. A rejection of this approach could not guarantee such protection, in particular in light of the UN Charter and the Preamble of the Rome Statute.14

Punishment under German law can here only follow from the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) or the VStGB. A direct recourse, for example, to the Rome Statute of the ICC or to treaties under international law would violate the principle of legality under Article 103(2) GG.15

Liability under Section 4 VStGB is the first to be considered. Accordingly, a military commander is punished if he fails to prevent an offence under the Code of Crimes against International Law. It must therefore first be clarified which offence under the VStGB might have been committed by the subordinate S.

a. Offence of the Subordinate

Genocide under Section 6 VStGB is ruled out. However, it could be a crime against humanity under Section 7 VStGB. Under Section 7(1) no. 1 VStGB, such a crime is committed where a person is killed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. The attack describes a general course of events into which various individual acts fit.16

The concept of attack is to be construed broadly. An attack is systematic if the use of force is organised and carried out in a planned manner, in the sense of consistent action.17 Purely coincidental events are thus not meant. An attack is widespread if it extends over a larger geographical target area and entails a larger number of victims. It is now predominantly recognised that the elements “widespread” and “systematic” must be present alternatively, but not cumulatively. A more detailed consideration is, however, not required here.18

The plan to deploy the AWS in the extended target area does not in any event involve a widespread or systematic use of force. A component of gravity is required that makes an attack appear to be of a certain organised scale. This is not the case with the present attack, which, at the outset, was intended to be directed specifically only at a military area. Section 7(1) no. 1 VStGB is therefore not fulfilled. For the same reason, Section 7(1) no. 8 VStGB is also ruled out.

It could, however, be a war crime under Section 8 VStGB. Under Section 8(1) no. 1 VStGB, whoever, in connection with an international or non-international armed conflict, kills a person who is to be protected under international humanitarian law incurs criminal liability. This covers confrontations between two or more States.19 The persons who are to be protected under international humanitarian law are defined by statute in Section 8(6) VStGB. Under Section 8(6) no. 1 VStGB, persons protected under the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) include, namely, the wounded, the sick, the shipwrecked, prisoners of war and civilians.

As already explained, civilians must be distinguished from soldiers. This follows from the principle of distinction, cf. Art. 48 AP I. Likewise, civilians must necessarily be spared, the so-called principle of precaution under Art. 57 AP I. Approximately 100 civilians and wounded soldiers were killed and further civilians injured. In international armed conflicts, however, Section 8(6) no. 1 VStGB does not cover attacks carried out from a distance. For civilian victims of an attack from a distance, Section 11 VStGB is regularly applicable.20

In this context, liability under Section 11(1) no. 3 VStGB must therefore be addressed. Accordingly, a person incurs criminal liability who, in connection with an international or non-international armed conflict, carries out an attack by military means in the certain expectation that the attack will cause death or injury to civilians. The German legislature has likewise regulated a result-based aggravation in Section 11(2) VStGB. Ultimately, Section 11(1) no. 3 VStGB enshrines the principle of proportionality under Art. 51(5)(b) AP I. The military objective pursued must therefore not be out of proportion to the danger created by the operation.

Whether such a violation exists is to be determined by weighing the circumstances of the individual case. As already pointed out, such a case no longer concerns incidental harm. The foreseeable civilian collateral damage must be so immense that carrying out such an attack no longer appears comprehensible in any way. Here, the attack by the AWS was carried out and maintained in order not to jeopardise the planned military element of surprise. On the basis of this circumstance, it does not appear sufficient to put forward this motive alone as justification for the killing and endangering of such numbers of persons. Disproportionality with regard to the military advantage is thus established.

In subjective terms, Section 11(1) no. 3 VStGB requires certain expectation. This means that dolus directus of the second degree, that is, certain knowledge or awareness (Wissentlichkeit), is required. S defined the operational area of the AWS in such a way that civilians in residential buildings could also be hit. He knew the risk and, on the basis of the report on the harm already incurred, knew that further civilians would certainly be affected. Certain knowledge of the endangerment of civilians with regard to the disproportionate extent is thus established. Section 11(1) no. 3 VStGB is fulfilled.

b. Interim Conclusion

The subordinate S has consequently committed an offence under the VStGB. By failing to prevent this offence, K has incurred criminal liability under Section 4 VStGB. Section 14 VStGB, on violation of the duty of supervision, is applicable only if the commander does not recognise the offence by the subordinate. Liability under Section 15 VStGB for failure to report a crime is ruled out by analogy to Section 258(5) StGB. He does not have to disclose his own punishable omission.21 With regard to Sections 14 and 15 VStGB, it should moreover be noted that such an offence must have a connection to the Federal Republic of Germany in order for applicability to be affirmed, cf. Section 1 VStGB.

Section 3 VStGB must in principle be examined, since S acts upon the military order of K. A person acts without guilt if he does not realise that his conduct is unlawful. S independently defines the operational area in such a way that civilians are also endangered. He therefore cannot rely on Section 3 VStGB with regard to this operational design undertaken on his own responsibility.

Moreover, there is no further scope of application for the Rome Statute of the ICC here if the German State carries out the prosecution, cf. Art. 17(1)(a) Rome Statute.22

In addition, pursuant to Section 2 VStGB, liability of K under Sections 211 and 13(1) StGB also comes into consideration in principle, provided that German criminal law applies to the offence committed abroad under Sections 3 et seq. StGB.

Developers and Manufacturers

Continuation of the Case

The case above could now be continued. The German developer E was responsible for the entire development process. This included the configuration of the object recognition software. Owing to a programming error, uncertain detections were wrongly classified as military targets and the warning message actually intended for the operator was suppressed. During the operation, the system wrongly recognised hatchets and axes, which civilians were carrying for self-defence, as military weapons. As a result, a residential building was classified as a military target and attacked.

With proper programming, the attack would not have been released automatically. E had failed, in breach of duty, to detect the error and nevertheless released the software for use.

a. German Law

First, Section 2 VStGB provides that the general criminal law applies insofar as the special provisions of the VStGB are not applicable. By failing, in breach of duty, to detect this error, E may have incurred criminal liability for negligent killing under Section 222 StGB. Since E, as a German developer, was a German national at the time of the offence, the active personality principle applies under Section 7(2) no. 1 StGB. Accordingly, German criminal law also applies to offences committed abroad if the act is a criminal offence at the place of its commission or if that place is not subject to any criminal law jurisdiction. German criminal law can therefore also apply in the present case.

The question arises whether E committed a breach of the duty of care that is relevant under criminal law and whether this breach also materialised in the result (causal link of the breach of duty, Pflichtwidrigkeitszusammenhang). On an ex-ante view, the nature and degree of care follow from the requirements that, in view of the situation of danger, are to be expected of a conscientious person. As the responsible developer, E was obliged to verify the safety-relevant functions before the release of the AWS. In principle, however, a developer cannot be held criminally responsible for every error in the programming process. Such matters are frequently resolved through civil law.23 Of particular relevance are rather cases in which safety-relevant functions are deliberately manipulated or designed in such a way that an unlawful use of the system is made possible or promoted.24

b. ICC Law

Under Art. 25(1) Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over natural persons. Art. 25(3) Rome Statute sets out the conditions under which a natural person incurs criminal liability. Commission jointly with another (or through another person) under Art. 25(3)(a) Rome Statute or ordering, soliciting or inducing under Art. 25(3)(b) Rome Statute is ruled out here. Art. 25(3)(c) Rome Statute comes into consideration first. Accordingly, a person is criminally responsible who, for the purpose of facilitating such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission. This covers acts that are directly aimed at furthering the crime. Even mere encouragement suffices.25 E fully undertook and carried out the programming of the AWS. Without his development of this system, it would not have been operational. He has thus objectively supported the offence of S.

To satisfy the offence definition, however, E would also have to fulfil the subjective requirements. These are in principle governed by Art. 30 Rome Statute26, unless otherwise provided. The act of assistance must be carried out for the purpose of facilitating the principal offence. The assisting person must thus directly aim at this effect of his contribution. E assumed that the AWS would not be used for such operations. During development, he therefore did not aim to knowingly support such an attack. In practice, the issue here will regularly be whether such a use was possibly accepted with approval (billigend in Kauf genommen), where there were indications of corresponding intentions. The discussion on the recognition of dolus eventualis (Eventualvorsatz) would then become relevant in this context. Former soldiers often work on the development of corresponding systems themselves, so that the demarcation is not seamless. Criminal responsibility comes into consideration where the software was designed in such a way that it is used for acts that are unlawful (under international law). In conclusion, E has thus not incurred criminal liability.

Outlook

It has been established that the entirety of the construct of international criminal law can be presented as a system that is a consequence of the humanity that is to be guaranteed. Under Art. 36 AP I, each High Contracting Party is obliged, in the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party. This is a State duty of review.


  1. Welsch/Meier, Welche Strategie verfolgt der russische Luftkrieg gegen die Ukraine und wie kann man Städte und zivile Infrastruktur besser schützen?, Ukraine-Analysen Nr. 311 (2025), 8, 9. In this respect, a distinction must also be made between the terms “automated” and “autonomous”. An automated deployment does not necessarily mean a deployment using artificial intelligence. See on this: Simmler/Markwalder, Roboter in der Verantwortung? – Zur Neuauflage der Debatte um den funktionalen Schuldbegriff, ZSTW (2017), 20, 23. ↩︎

  2. Barlag/Beck, Menschlichkeit im Krieg? Die Bedeutung von „Meaningful Human Control“ für die Regulierung von autonomen Waffensystemen, Ethik und Militär (2024), 60, 60 f.; cf. Geiss, Die völkerrechtliche Dimension autonomer Waffensysteme, FES 2015, p. 18; Zhu, Lu, Ding, Lee et al., Designing meaningful human oversight in AI, AI Ethics (2026), 286, 286. ↩︎

  3. Gillich/Fink, Humanitäres Völkerrecht, 2nd ed., Nomos 2026, p. 344. ↩︎

  4. Frau, Der Einsatz von Drohnen: Eine völkerrechtliche Betrachtung, VN (2013), 99, 102; cf. also Heintze/Lülf, Drohnen und das Humanitäre Völkerrecht, 2014, available at: https://frieden-durch-recht.info/drohnen-und-das-humanitaere-voelkerrecht/ (last accessed on 04.09.2026). ↩︎

  5. Connolly, Wie geht es mit den Bemühungen um ein rechtsverbindliches Abkommen zu autonomen Waffensystemen weiter?, Ethik und Militär (2024), 4, 9. ↩︎

  6. Sparrow has thus examined the case in which soldiers surrender and therefore no longer fight. The AWS would nevertheless now kill these soldiers. Owing to the black-box problem, the decision-making of the AWS cannot always be traced. In the case of a human being, however, it can. From a moral point of view alone, this would always give rise to a responsibility gap - Sparrow, Killer robots, Journal of Applied Philosophy (2007), 62, 62-77. Here, too, the question of meaningful human control is to be raised. All of these considerations, however, are as a rule philosophical, moral and societal assessments and not ones in which the legal evaluation forms the focus. In the literature it has also in part been proposed to deploy AWS only against objects, see on this Arendt, Der Einsatz autonomer Waffensysteme im Lichte des Verhältnismäßigkeits- und Unterscheidungsgrundsatzes, JusIntEu (2014), 33, 33 f; Simmler/Markwalder, Roboter in der Verantwortung? – Zur Neuauflage der Debatte um den funktionalen Schuldbegriff, ZSTW (2017), 20, 43 ff; Gless/Wohlers, Subsumtionsautomat 2.0 - Künstliche Intelligenz statt menschlicher Richter?, in: Böse/Schumann/Toepel (eds.), Festschrift für Urs Kindhäuser zum 70. Geburtstag, Nomos Verlag 2019, 147, 161. ↩︎

  7. Verbatim: It was his “affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.”, available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/327/1/ accessed on 14.09.2026. ↩︎

  8. See on this: Bläsius, Künstliche Intelligenz und Krieg, Springer 2026, p. 24 ff.; cf. also Simmler/Markwalder, Roboter in der Verantwortung? – Zur Neuauflage der Debatte um den funktionalen Schuldbegriff, ZSTW (2017), 20, 46. ↩︎

  9. BGHSt 37, 106 – juris. ↩︎

  10. Hilgendorf, Virtuelle Realitäten, Metaverse, Generative KI und (Straf-)Recht, JZ (2024), 677, 684. ↩︎

  11. MüKoStGB/Ambos, 4th ed. C.H. Beck 2022, VStGB Section 1 para. 5. ↩︎

  12. Jeßberger/Trampe, Völkerstrafrecht in Deutschland: Eine Einführung Teil 1: Grundlagen, Entwicklungslinien, Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, BRZ (2026), 3, 8. ↩︎

  13. MüKoStGB/Ambos, 4th ed. C.H. Beck 2022, VStGB Section 1 para. 22. ↩︎

  14. Cf. on this also: MüKoStGB/Ambos, 4th ed. C.H. Beck 2022, VStGB Section 1 para. 11; Eser, in: FS Meyer-Goßner, 2001, p. 19. ↩︎

  15. MüKoStGB/Werle/Jeßberger, 4th ed. C.H. Beck 2022, VStGB Section 7 para. 12; Gropengießer/Kreicker, in: Eser/Kreicker, Nationale Strafverfolgung völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen – National Prosecution of International Crimes, edition iuscrim 2003, p. 139. ↩︎

  16. MüKoStGB/Werle/Jeßberger, 4th ed. C.H. Beck 2022, VStGB Section 7 para. 23. ↩︎

  17. MüKoStGB/Werle/Jeßberger, 4th ed. C.H. Beck 2022, VStGB Section 7 para. 27. ↩︎

  18. Cf. MüKoStGB/Werle/Jeßberger, 4th ed. C.H. Beck 2022, VStGB Section 7 para. 28. ↩︎

  19. MüKoStGB/Geiß/Zimmermann, 4th ed. C.H. Beck, VStGB Section 8 para. 98. ↩︎

  20. BT-Drs.14/8524, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches, p. 26. ↩︎

  21. MüKoStGB/Weigend/Kuhli, 4th ed. C.H. Beck, VStGB Section 15 para. 23. ↩︎

  22. See the above remarks on the complementary system. ↩︎

  23. See on this the example of aircraft and the autopilot, cf. Rieks/Koch, „Wer auf überlegene Technologien verzichtet, verzichtet darauf, ethisch verantwortbar handeln zu können“, Ethik und Militär (2024), 86, 90. ↩︎

  24. Similarly: Hilgendorf, Virtuelle Realitäten, Metaverse, Generative KI und (Straf-)Recht, JZ (2024), 677, 684. ↩︎

  25. Satzger, Internationales und Europäisches Strafrecht, 11th ed., Nomos 2025, p. 409 para. 62. ↩︎

  26. Within the scope of Art. 30 Rome Statute, there is no uniform view on whether even dolus eventualis (Eventualvorsatz) is sufficient; on this dispute see Satzger, Internationales und Europäisches Strafrecht, 11th ed., Nomos 2025, p. 391 para. 21 to p. 395 para. 28. ↩︎

Suggested citation

Zierhut, Annika S.: Attribution of criminal responsibility in the case of the deployment of military AI systems, Zierhut Jura, September 11, 2026, https://zierhut-jura.de/en/artikel/attribution-of-criminal-responsibility-in-the-case-of-the-deployment-of-military-ai-systems/.