The Second Key Point of the Case
Even if fraud at the conclusion of the contract (Eingehungsbetrug) is already assumed at the time the contract is concluded, the examination is not yet complete. For after the later faked death, the question arises whether there is now, in addition, attempted fraud in the performance of the contract (versuchter Erfüllungsbetrug). This initially sounds obvious. After all, the plan has now been carried out. The death has been feigned, and the insurer is supposed to pay. Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) has drawn a line here and, in the specific case, expressly denied attempted fraud in the performance of the contract. The BGH denied the existence of attempted fraud in the performance of the contract on the ground that, “according to the defendants’ conception, significant intermediate steps were still required to obtain the sum insured, so that, from their perspective, they had not yet taken a direct and immediate step towards the commission of fraud in the performance of the contract.”1
Distinguishing Fraud at the Conclusion of the Contract from Fraud in the Performance of the Contract
The two variants of fraud must be differentiated cleanly.
Fraud at the conclusion of the contract (Eingehungsbetrug) concerns the time the contract is concluded. Fraud in the performance of the contract (Erfüllungsbetrug) concerns the later phase in which performance under the contract is actually demanded or rendered.
Particularly with life insurance, there is often a considerable temporal break in between. This separation is precisely what matters legally. For not every preparation for the later payout is already a direct and immediate step towards fraud in the performance of the contract.2
Commencement of the Attempt
For a punishable attempt, it is not sufficient that the offender has a firm criminal plan. What is decisive is whether, according to their conception, they take a direct and immediate step towards the realisation of the offence, cf. Section 22 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB).
The act of deception must be specified to such an extent that, according to the plan, it is to pass directly into the error, the disposition of assets (Vermögensverfügung) and the damage.
It is not sufficient merely to fake the death if, from the offenders’ perspective, further significant steps are still required before the insurer would actually pay.
The Mere Staging of the Death
According to the BGH, this was precisely the case here. The offenders knew that the sums insured would not simply be paid out on the basis of a mere notification of death. Rather, it was clear to them that further proof was still required for this, in particular a death certificate or at least a corresponding official proof of death.3 Thus the element of immediacy was lacking.
If the mere staging of the death were already affirmed as an attempt at fraud in the performance of the contract, the requirements of attempt would be shifted very far forward. There would then be a danger of no longer separating preparation and attempt cleanly. In the criminal law of fraud, however, this distinction is central. The notice of loss to the insurer, as a duty (Obliegenheit) of the policyholder within the meaning of Section 30(2) of the Insurance Contract Act (Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, VVG), is accordingly to be classified as an act of preparation and not yet as an act of attempt relevant under criminal law.4
Partial Realisation of the Criminal Plan
It is quite possible to argue differently. Whoever has already credibly staged the death and informed the insurer of it has, after all, realised a substantial part of their plan.5 This consideration is not implausible. It reaches its limit, however, where an independent intermediate step relevant to deception is still required. If the insurer would not pay without official proof in any event, then the threshold decisive for fraud in the performance of the contract has not yet been fully reached.
The Second Act of Deception
Actual fraud in the performance of the contract regularly presupposes that the insured event is not merely planned or staged internally but is asserted against the insurer in a form directed at payment.
In the case discussed, the mere feigning of the death was not yet sufficient for this. Only the submission of an official document, or at least the concrete assertion of the claim using such proof, could have crossed the threshold to attempt.6 Only then can the attempt be affirmed. Likewise, abandonment of the attempt is still possible without difficulty. In this respect, an assessment such as that made by the BGH is consistent with the concept of abandonment of attempt under Section 24 StGB.
Pecuniary Damage in This Phase
Here too, the separation is important. Within fraud in the performance of the contract, only the exchange of performances is taken into account. A distinction must be drawn between genuine and non-genuine fraud in the performance of the contract (echter und unechter Erfüllungsbetrug). In genuine fraud in the performance of the contract, the deception takes place only upon performance of the respective contract, and it is to be affirmed where the victim either receives less than it can claim under the contract or performs more than it is obliged to perform under the contract.
In non-genuine fraud in the performance of the contract, no further deception is needed upon performance of the contract. Rather, the deception carried out at the conclusion of the contract continues to have effect in the performance phase.7 As already mentioned, a renewed deception is as a rule required, namely with regard to the submission of a death certificate after the death has been faked. The deception carried out in the course of the conclusion of the contract does continue to have effect in a certain sense. However, payment of the sum insured cannot take place without a renewed and independent deception. It is therefore regularly a case of genuine (attempted) fraud in the performance of the contract.8
With regard to the possible pecuniary damage, it can be argued that harm by endangerment (Gefährdungsschaden) is regarded in the literature as “transitional damage on the way to the final damage” (Durchgangsschaden zum Endschaden). This means that in the end there would be two instances of damage to be distinguished in terms of criminal law, but fraud at the conclusion of the contract would turn into fraud in the performance of the contract. For this reason, the BGH had, in its earlier case law, merely assumed the possibility of a deepening of the damage (Schadensvertiefung) once the sum insured had been paid out.9
Practical Significance
The judgment makes clear that criminal law, even in the case of elaborately prepared concepts of deception, does not automatically treat every preliminary stage as an attempt in its own right.
This is important in practice. Otherwise, very early acts of preparation would receive the same assessment under criminal law.
Legal Significance
The faked death alone is not necessarily sufficient for attempted fraud in the performance of the contract. What is decisive is whether, from the offenders’ perspective, significant steps are still required before the insurer is actually to be deceived about the payout.
If official proof of death still has to be obtained and submitted, the threshold to attempt is regularly not yet reached. It is precisely for this reason that it is convincing, in such cases, to assume fraud at the conclusion of the contract but still to deny attempted fraud in the performance of the contract.
It is essential that the consideration of normative factors does not get out of hand. The character of Section 263 StGB as an offence of self-harm and an offence against assets would otherwise be perverted.10
BGH, judgment of 8 December 2021 – 5 StR 236/21 – juris, para. 24. ↩︎
Kindhäuser/Böse, StR BT II, § 27 para. 86; cf. also BGH, NJW 1991, p. 1839 (1839); BGH, NStZ 2011, p. 400 (401); BGH, NStZ 2015, p. 207 (208); KG Berlin, BeckRS 2012, 12410; OLG Hamm, BeckRS 2011, 26423; cf. Fischer, StGB, § 263 para. 9; Waßmer, HRRS 2012, p. 368 (371). ↩︎
BGH, judgment of 8 December 2021 – 5 StR 236/21 – juris, para. 27. ↩︎
Waßmer, HRRS 2012, p. 368 (371); Fischer, StGB, § 263 para. 176 c; cf. also on the notice of loss: BGHSt 40, 299 (302). ↩︎
S/S/Eser/Bosch, § 22 para. 37; Küper, JZ 1992, p. 338 (341-343). ↩︎
Cf. also Waßmer, HRRS 2012, p. 368 (373). ↩︎
Esser/Rübenstahl/Saliger/Tsambikakis WStR/Saliger, § 263 paras. 206-208; Rengier, StR BT I, § 13 paras. 196-198. ↩︎
Cf. LK/Tiedemann, § 263 para. 202. ↩︎
Thielmann, StraFo 2010, p. 412 (418); Hellmann, in: FS Kühl, 2014, p. 691 (705); BGH, NJW 2009, p. 3448 (3465); critical of this: Thielmann, StraFo 2010, p. 412 (418). ↩︎
Cf. Rönnau, in: FS Rissing-van Saan, 2011, p. 517 (543). ↩︎
Zierhut, Annika S.: Why a Faked Death Does Not Necessarily Amount to Attempted Fraud in the Performance of the Contract, Zierhut Jura, March 14, 2026, https://zierhut-jura.de/en/artikel/why-a-faked-death-does-not-necessarily-amount-to-attempted-fraud-in-the-performance-of-the-contract/.