Fraud in Connection with a Life Insurance Contract
At first glance, the case appears relatively straightforward: a person takes out several life insurance policies, later fakes their own death and then wants the sum insured to be paid out. In terms of criminal law, however, the matter is more complicated. The question arises at an earlier stage, namely whether fraud can already be assumed at the conclusion of the contract itself.
This is precisely where the discussion about so-called fraud at the conclusion of the contract (Eingehungsbetrug) begins. This denotes fraud that is assumed not only at the time of the later payout or performance, but already at the moment a contract comes into being.
The underlying case is so interesting for this reason. With life insurance, the criminally relevant point of reference can lie considerably earlier, long before even one euro of the sum insured is paid out.
Substantive Classification of the Judgment
The defendants took out several life insurance policies. Their plan was to merely feign the death of the insured person at a later point in order to obtain the sums insured. In this context, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) pointed out that Eingehungsbetrug comes into consideration where, at the conclusion of the contract, there is deception about the willingness to pay and about the intention to feign the insured event soon afterwards.1
Not only the later assertion of the sum insured is of interest in terms of criminal law. The conclusion of the contract may already be problematic if the policyholder has no intention, from the outset, of behaving in accordance with the contract.
The Concept of Deception
It must be clarified what constitutes the criminally relevant act of deception upon the conclusion of a life insurance contract. The subject matter of a deception within the meaning of Section 263 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) is the pretence of false facts or the distortion or suppression of true facts, so that the mental image of another person is influenced. Facts are events or circumstances of the past or present that are capable of being proven. Pure value judgments are not covered by the concept of deception. This deception must, moreover, be capable of causing an error, for example where illnesses are concealed or existing insurance policies are knowingly misstated.2
One conceivable scenario is the express declaration of false information within the framework of the general insurance terms (Allgemeine Versicherungsbedingungen, AVB). This could involve false information, for instance about illnesses, or the denial that comparable life insurance policies exist elsewhere. In most cases, however, this is implausible for an offender who merely wants to fake their later death.3
In the case discussed here, however, the issue is above all deception by implication (konkludente Täuschung). In the case of deception by implication, misleading conduct is engaged in to which a particular declaratory value is attributed in light of the general understanding in commerce.4
In this respect, the BGH refers to its remarks made in the context of the well-known “Al Qaida case”. According to these, the offender deceives, among other things, about the inner fact that they will not behave in accordance with the contract, or rather that they will behave dishonestly, and will not misuse the insurance cover.5 Logically, the unwillingness to pay and the faking of the occurrence of the condition are based on dishonesty. It should be noted, however, that the Federal Constitutional Court objected to the BGH’s decision in the Al Qaida case with regard to the determination of pecuniary damage: such damage must be quantified in amount and set out in an economically comprehensible manner.6 The BGH’s reference here, however, concerns solely the act of deception.
A Factor Atypical of Insurance
In terms of criminal law, it is formally incorrect simply to impute “dishonesty” or “bad intentions”. That would be too imprecise and would overstretch the offence of fraud. That would be highly problematic from the standpoint of the dogmatics of fraud.
What is decisive is therefore not a moral assessment. By implicitly declaring that they will not deviate from the basis of the transaction (Geschäftsgrundlage), while manipulating that basis precisely through the (determined) feigning of the insured event, the offender turns a factor atypical of insurance into the basis of the transaction.7
A life insurance contract works on the principle that the insured risk remains a calculable risk to the extent possible. The insurer sets premiums precisely because uncertain events may occur, not because the policyholder deliberately brings about or feigns the insured event. Thus the insurance contract has, for example, the special feature that all risk-relevant circumstances must be disclosed pursuant to Section 19(1) sentence 1 of the Insurance Contract Act (Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, VVG).8
Whoever therefore intends from the outset merely to stage a death shifts the basis of the contract. A secured risk becomes a manipulated course of events. This is precisely where the criminally relevant core of the deception lies.
The Payment of Premiums
In parts of the literature, it is also discussed whether deception, as established by the BGH, is also present where the offender at least ensures that premiums are paid until the death is faked.9 Against this speaks the fact that the offender wishes to pay the premiums properly only to a limited extent. Through the intention to fake the insured event, he sets an inner limit that is not inherent in the contract.10
This interpretation of the act of deception is also not precluded by the limit of the wording, which constitutes the outermost limit of statutory interpretation. This follows from the principle of legality under Article 103(2) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) in conjunction with Section 1 StGB. Deception about the inner willingness to manipulate lies within the possible limit of the wording.11
Relevance of the Classification
In conclusion, it can be established that express deception is unlikely. Deception by implication through the policyholder’s intention to manipulate the individual basis of the transaction (with regard to the payment of premiums and the occurrence of the condition) is to be affirmed. The reasoning, as set out by the BGH, is therefore convincing.
BGH, judgment of 8 December 2021 − 5 StR 236/21 – (available at www.bundesgerichtshof.de). ↩︎
BeckOK-StGB/Beuckelmann, § 263 para. 3, para. 9; Satzger/Schluckebier/Widmaier StGB/Satzger, § 263 paras. 17-19, para. 33; in detail on this: LK/Tiedemann, § 263 para. 11. ↩︎
Satzger/Schluckebier/Widmaier StGB/Satzger, § 263 para. 41; cf. S/S/Perron, § 263 paras. 14-15. ↩︎
Cf. BeckOK-StGB/Beuckelmann, § 263 para. 13. ↩︎
BGH, judgment of 8 December 2021 – 5 StR 236/21 – juris, para. 19; cf. BGH, NJW 2009, p. 3448 (3464). ↩︎
BVerfG, decision of 7 December 2011 – 2 BvR 2500/09 et al., BVerfGE 130, 1 (paras. 176 et seq.). ↩︎
Funck, Täuschungsbedingter Betrugsschaden, p. 215; cf. Kraatz, JR 2012, p. 329 (331); likewise in the case of a sports bet: cf. BGHSt 51, 165 (para. 18); Joecks, wistra 2010, p. 179 (179). ↩︎
Lindenau, Die Betrugsstrafbarkeit des Versicherungsnehmers aus strafrechtlicher und kriminologischer Sicht, p. 234; Wessels/Hillenkamp/Schuhr, StR BT 2, § 13 para. 522; denying the intention to manipulate as a possible risk-relevant circumstance: Funck, Täuschungsbedingter Betrugsschaden, p. 221. ↩︎
Cf. Funck, Täuschungsbedingter Betrugsschaden, p. 216. ↩︎
Cf. BGH, NJW 2009, p. 3448 (3465). ↩︎
Mehl, Das Verschleifungsverbot, pp. 16, 131; Esser/Rübenstahl/Saliger/Tsambikakis WStR/Esser, § 1 para. 1; likewise in the Hoyzer judgment: BGH, NJW 2007, p. 782 (785). ↩︎
Zierhut, Annika S.: Why Fraud Concerning a Life Insurance Policy Can Already Be Committed at the Conclusion of the Contract, Zierhut Jura, March 10, 2026, https://zierhut-jura.de/en/artikel/why-fraud-concerning-a-life-insurance-policy-can-already-be-committed-at-the-conclusion-of-the-contract/.